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Abstract
Markets have an exposure problem when getting to the optimal allocation
requires a sequence of transactions which if started but not completed leaves
at least one trader with losses. We use laboratory experiments to evaluate
the effect of the exposure problem on alternative market mechanisms. The
continuous double auction performs poorly: efficiency is only 20% when expo-
sure is high and 55% when it is low. A package market effectively eliminates
the exposure problem: in low and high exposure treatments efficiency is 82%
and 89% respectively. Building on stability notions from matching theory we
introduce the concept of mechanism stability. A model of trade that com-
bines mechanism stability with noisy best responses and imperfect foresight
explains the difference in market performance. Finally, decentralized bargai-
ning with contingent contracts performs well with perfect information and
communication but not in the more realistic case when traders’ preferences
are privately known.
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1. Introduction
Monetary theorists since at least Jevons have recognized how using money as a
medium of exchange can facilitate trade. Ostensibly, the double coincidence of
wants problem that occurs in barter can be solved by letting traders arrive at their
desired allocation of goods via a series of bilateral transactions involving money.
But when the market is thin and getting to a desired allocation requires a series of
trades, the first of which leaves an agent worse off than not trading, the agent may
be reluctant to make the first trade for two reasons. First, subsequent trades may
not be executed. Second, even if it were certain that subsequent trades will occur,
the initial trade may weaken the agent’s bargaining position to the extent that the
loss cannot be recouped. Either way, while the introduction of money solves Jevons’
double coincidence of wants problem it does not protect traders from being exposed
to losses. Anticipating this exposure problem, traders may be unwilling to make the
first trade leaving potential gains from trade unrealized.
The goal of this paper is to examine how different market mechanisms perform
in reassignment problems when exposure is present. The first mechanism we test is
the continuous double auction (CDA). Our interest in the CDA is natural since it
is the most-commonly used institution for contemporary financial and commodity
markets. Furthermore, the CDA has an impressive track record in the lab and many
experimenters would probably guess it would perform well in the simple environ-
ments we study: four subjects each own a house, each demand one house, and each
have values for all four houses. When subjects’ values are common knowledge, the
possible gains from trade are apparent. Nevertheless, observed efficiency levels in
the CDA are very low with many instances of no trade or losses. While this poor
performance contrasts with that of previous studies, it has an intuitive explanation
in terms of exposure. In our setup, houses are substitutes, which implies that initial
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trades often result in losses. Traders risk being financially exposed when such losses
cannot be recouped in subsequent trades, e.g. when there is strategic uncertainty
about others’ bargaining behavior.
To quantify the effects of exposure, we compare market performance in two
parallel treatments. In the low-exposure treatment, all house values are shifted
downward by a common constant compared to the values used in the high-exposure
treatment. As a result, the optimal allocation and the total gains from trade are
the same but the risk associated with buying a second house is less. We find that
this manipulation has a strong positive effect. Efficiency levels are significantly
and substantially higher in the low-exposure treatment, providing evidence for the
impact of exposure on market performance.1
The second mechanism we test is a package market that is a simple extension
of the CDA. Like the CDA, it allows for standard buy and sell offers involving a
single house and some amount of cash. In addition, it allows for arbitrary “package
offers” involving several houses and cash, such as where one house is offered, one is
demanded, plus some amount of cash is offered or demanded. Such package offers
allow subjects to exchange houses without risking ending up with two houses or no
house. And, unlike the top-trading-cycle procedure discussed below, such exchanges
may involve money. The package market performs better than the CDA: efficiency
is 82% when exposure is low and 89% when exposure is high.
The third mechanism we test is decentralized bargaining. We ran experiments
to test whether the good performance of the package market can be achieved by
decentralized trading. We find that decentralized bargaining with contingent con-
1Another potential source of inefficiency is the fact that traders have complete information
about who owns what house. In particular, they know when others are in a weak bargaining
position, e.g. when holding two houses, which may create a hold-out problem. We find that
revealing less information about who owns which house and previous trades reduces but does not
eliminate efficiency losses.
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tracts can deliver comparable efficiency levels to the package market when there is
perfect information and communication is allowed. When house values are privately
known, however, bargaining performs worse irrespective of whether communication
is possible.
To put the experimental performance results in perspective, we simulate effi-
ciency numbers for the well-known top-trading-cycle procedure (Shapley and Scarf,
1974).2 Without money this simple procedure obviously cannot be fully efficient
but it does outperform the CDA in both the low and high-exposure treatments. We
also consider a variant of the ascending clock auction. Like the top-trading-cycle
procedure, the modified ascending clock auction (MACA) is a strategy-proof me-
chanism that guarantees homeowners will end up at least as well off as their initial
allocation.3 The cost of this guarantee is that the mechanism does not always result
in efficient allocations. In simulations, the MACA also outperforms the CDA.
Among the mechanisms tested, the package market performs best in the face of
exposure: efficiency levels are high and significantly above those for the CDA. This
improvement can partially be understood by comparing allocations that are stable
under the two mechanisms. We say an allocation is m-stable if all allocations that
can be reached via a single trade under mechanism m make at least one trader worse
off. For example, in the CDA, an efficient swap of houses requires two trades and the
status quo is stable if the first trade lowers total surplus. In contrast, in the package
market, an efficient swap can be completed in a single trade so the status quo is
not stable. More generally, assuming trade does not occur if the current allocation
is stable predicts efficiency levels of 23% (70%) in the CDA when exposure is high
2The top-trading-cycle procedure proceeds in several steps: in each step, agents point to the
house they prefer most among those available and houses (and owners) that form cycles are re-
moved. A cycle may consist of a single owner pointing to their own house. A variant of the
top-trading-cycle procedure is used for kidney exchange, see Roth et al. (2005).
3This mechanism was suggested to us by Philippe Jehiel.
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(low). For the package market, predicted efficiency is 100% in both cases as an
efficient reassignment is always possible via a single multilateral trade.
While m-stability produces aggregate efficiencies similar to observed levels, its
deterministic predictions are trivially refuted by the individual trade data. Moreo-
ver, m-stability assumes myopic agents who think only one trade ahead. Building
on recent approaches to “bounded rationality” we explore a more flexible model that
can be estimated using individual trades. We consider agents who plan k = 1, 2, . . .
steps ahead, akin to the level-k approach (e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995),
and who make noisy best responses, as in the QRE approach (e.g. Goeree, Holt,
and Palfrey, 2016). Fitting this model to individual trade data reproduces the main
features of the data including the improved efficiency of the package market relative
to the CDA.
Since the package market is a straightforward adaptation of the CDA, it could
potentially be applied in a variety of contexts. Besides real-estate, one could think
of markets for other expensive durables such as cars, boats, etc. Another obvious
candidate is financial markets where “pure swaps,” i.e. package orders that do not
involve money, are often introduced to mitigate the exposure problem. A different
application concerns the trading of sports players. Whether a team wants to sell a
certain player will often depend on whether they can find a suitable replacement. In
these applications, package orders could facilitate more efficient outcomes especially
when the market is thin.
1.1. Related literature
This paper contributes to an emerging literature on package markets, which builds
on three more established strands: that on the continuous double auction, that on
two-sided matching without money, and that on package auctions. Figure 1 shows
the connections between the different mechanisms.
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Figure 1: Relationships between mechanisms
The continuous double auction: Vernon Smith’s (1962) finding that behavior in
the CDA robustly converges to competitive equilibrium outcomes is remarkable in
that convergence occurs when it is not predicted. The experiments employ only a
small number of buyers and sellers, there is no common knowledge of supply and
demand, and subjects are not price takers but rather price makers. In these early
experiments, however, exposure is not present. A few more-recent studies have found
limits to the domain where the CDA performs well. Van Boening and Wilcox (1996)
find that the CDA fails in the presence of avoidable costs with observed efficiencies
of 50% or less and highly erratic price dynamics. Mestelman and Welland (1987)
find lower efficiencies with advance production compared to production on demand.
One explanation for the CDA’s poor performance in these settings is the effect of
exposure. Our paper identifies a new simple setting where the CDA performs poorly
and provides evidence that the poor performance is indeed due to exposure. The
package market we propose restores efficiency by adding conditional offers to the
CDA that protect traders from exposure.
Two-sided matching markets without money: The past two decades have seen impor-
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tant advances in the theory and application of matching mechanisms, e.g. assigning
doctors to hospitals (Roth and Peranson, 1999) and matching kidney donors with
recipients (Roth et al., 2004). Using mechanisms where participants can express
preferences over multiple outcomes protects them from various forms of exposure.
For example, with decentralized applications, newly trained doctors face exposure
when hospitals offer placements with short deadlines. Should they accept an offer
in hand and risk missing out on getting a better one later or let it expire and risk
a worse outcome? A donor-recipient pair faces exposure when donating a kidney
without simultaneously receiving one in return.4 Mechanisms based on Deferred
Acceptance (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and Top Trading Cycles (Shapley and Scarf,
1974) provide elegant solutions to these problems when using money is not allowed.
In settings where it is, however, they leave potential gains from trade unrealized.
The package market we introduce takes one of the desirable features of matching
mechanisms, i.e. allowing participants to express preferences over multiple goods to
avoid exposure, and uses it in a mechanism with money so that the full gains from
trade can be realized.
Package auctions: In one-sided auctions, the exposure problem arises when comple-
mentary goods are sold individually. A prominent example is the sale of spectrum
licenses for wireless and mobile phone applications. Telecom operators typically
want consecutive blocks of spectrum within a band or combinations of licenses that
span adjacent geographic areas. In the simultaneous ascending auction, bidders com-
pete for large numbers of individual licenses over a series of rounds, with provisional
winners being announced after each round. This approach was pioneered by the
US FCC in 1994 and has been copied in other countries with considerable success.
But theoretical analyses (Goeree and Lien, 2014) and experimental evidence (e.g.
4To avoid this exposure problem, when several transplant operations are necessary they are
conducted simultaneously.
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Brunner et al., 2010) indicate that efficiency and revenue may be suppressed when
bidders hesitate to incorporate synergistic values into their bids for fear they win
only part of a desired combination. Package auctions avoid such exposure problems
by allowing bidders to compete for combinations of items using “all-or-nothing”
bids. The potential to improve efficiency and revenue has raised considerable in-
terest in package auction design. Furthermore, several innovations proposed in the
literature, e.g. the combinatorial clock auction, hierarchical package bidding, and
sealed-bid combinatorial auctions, have been applied in recent spectrum sales (see
Bichler and Goeree, 2017, for an up-to-date overview).
Package markets: There are several important differences that make the design
of package markets much harder (Milgrom, 2007). Innovations in package auction
design are unlikely to readily apply.5 For example, in an auction setting, it is
possible to design efficient, deficit-free mechanisms whereas in the market setting,
it is generally not, see Loertscher et al. (2015) for a recent review. In the auction
setting, it is possible to use a payment rule that, given reported values, selects prices
from the core (Day and Milgrom, 2007);6 in the market setting, the core does not
exist for all reported values, so such a payment rule cannot be used. Finally, in a
package auction, transactions are bilateral (between the auctioneer and one buyer),
while in a package market, transactions can be multilateral (multiple buyers and/or
multiple sellers).
Research on using package bidding in two-sided settings is much less developed.
When multiple buyers and multiple sellers compete and both sides of the market
value the items being traded, the exposure problem can arise with any type of good,
5See, however, Lubin et al. (2008) who develop a package market built around the combinatorial
ascending auction. The allocation and prices are determined iteratively with traders revising their
orders at each step.
6Core pricing is used in the combinatorial clock auction, which has been used to sell spectrum
in a number of countries since 2008.
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not just with complements. The intuition is that even when goods are substitutes
there can be complementarities between trades, as is the case for the house market
studied here.
One approach is a direct mechanism or call market where participants submit or-
ders once, and after a predetermined time, the allocation and prices are determined.
Bossaerts et al. (2002) suggest a market of this form for trading securities when
investors are interested in holding certain portfolios. Allowing traders to submit
package orders protects against being left holding an unbalanced portfolio, which
might otherwise occur when the markets are thin. Milgrom (2009) proposes a ge-
neralized message space – the space of assignment messages – for use in markets
and other direct mechanisms where goods are substitutes. Our approach is different
in that we extend a commonly-used market mechanism, the CDA, to accommodate
package orders. This extension generalizes package auctions to the case with multi-
ple buyers and multiple sellers with both sides of the market submitting preferences.
1.2. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents definitions related to expo-
sure and Section 3 describes the trading environment. In Section 4 we provide a
detailed account of how the simple continuous double auction market, the package
market, and decentralized bargaining are implemented. The experimental design is
explained in Section 5. We next provide results on market efficiency (Section 6.1),
the effect of exposure (Section 6.2), and then present the bargaining results (Section
6.3). In Section 7 we develop and estimate a Markov model of trading. Section
8 concludes. The appendix contains simulations with strategy proof mechanisms
(Section A), additional discussion of the bargaining results (Section B), screenshots
of the interface subjects used (Section C), and sample instructions (Section D).
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2. The exposure problem
Consider an exchange economy with a set of agents I, a set of indivisible commodities
H, and money. Agent i ∈ I has quasi-linear utility ui(ωi) + ci where the pair
(ci,ωi) is i’s allocation with ci the amount of money held and ωi ∈ Z|H|≥0 a vector of
commodities. Agent i’s initial allocation is denoted (ci,0,ωi,0). Agents can make a
finite sequence of trades, labeled t = 1, . . . , T , or not trade at all (T = 0). Trade
t consists of the pairs (yi,t,xi,t) for i ∈ I, describing the change in cash, yi,t, and
the change in commodities, xi,t, such that
∑
i∈I yi,t = 0 and
∑
i∈I xi,t = 0. Agent
i’s allocation following trade t is (ci,t,ωi,t) = (ci,0 +
∑t
j=1 yi,j,ωi,0 +
∑t
j=1 xi,j) and
i’s final allocation is (ci,T ,ωi,T ). The sequence of allocations can be used to define
different aspects of exposure.
Definition 1 An agent falls prey to exposure if their final allocation yields less
utility than one of the previous allocations.
Clearly, if agents can foresee the trading opportunities they will face, they should
not fall prey to exposure. However, if an agent makes a series of trades and the
prices of later trades are not fixed in advance, the agent may be exposed (at risk of
falling prey to exposure).
Definition 2 An agent makes an exposed trade if the allocation after the trade yields
less utility than the allocation before the trade.
Making an exposed trade does not imply falling prey to exposure. Indeed, getting
to a competitive equilibrium allocation could involve an exposed trade.
A market mechanism m specifies the types of trades that are permissible. For
example, whether trades involving multiple commodities or more than two counter-
parties are possible.
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Definition 3 There is an exposure problem in an economy with market mechanism
m if there exists an allocation from which getting to the optimal allocation requires
at least one trader to make an exposed trade.
This definition allows us to determine whether a market mechanism has an exposure
problem for a given economy. For example, consider a market mechanism where
items are traded one at a time so the first trade involves agent i buying a single
item from agent j for some i ̸= j. The gains πi and πj are defined as follows:
πi = ui(ωi,1)− ui(ωi,0)− p
πj = ui(ωj,1)− ui(ωj,0) + p
where p is the transaction price. If π < 0, then the agent makes an exposed trade.
Clearly, if πi + πj < 0, then at least one agent makes an exposed trade. The quasi-
linearity assumption implies that πi + πj is independent of p, so transactions where
one agent must make an exposed trade can be identified by only considering the item
traded. Suppose the initial allocation is not optimal. Finding a sequence of non-
exposed trades from the initial allocation to the optimal allocation establishes that
there is not an exposure problem. One way to establish that there is an exposure
problem is by showing all the first trades are exposed. Such allocations are stable
in the following sense.
Definition 4 An allocation is m-stable if no other allocation can be reached under
mechanism m without at least one trader making an exposed trade.
The next two sections introduce the economy and market mechanisms we study.
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3. The reassignment game
In Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) assignment game, there are m sellers and n buyers.
Each seller is endowed with an item. The buyers value all items while the sellers
value only the item they are endowed with. We study a symmetric variation of
this game where all n agents play the role of both buyer and seller. Indivisible and
differentiated items, houses, are traded for money. Each agent owns one house, so
|I| = |H|. Agent i is initially endowed with house i.
Each agent demands exactly one house. Each agent has a private value for each of
the houses, vhi ∼ U [¯v, v¯] where 0 ≤ ¯v < v¯. Agent i’s utility is max(v
1
i ω
1
i , . . . , v
n
i ω
n
i )+
ci. Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn} and Ω∗ be the allocation of houses to agents that maximizes
overall surplus. For this simple exchange economy, competitive prices always exist
and are usually not unique. All the competitive prices support the efficient allocation
and the set of competitive prices forms a bounded lattice (see also Shapley and
Shubik, 1971).
An example with four agents is shown in Table 1. The numbers in the table
represent agents’ values for each of the houses. The underlined values indicate
which house each agent is initially endowed with while the starred values indicate
the allocation that maximizes surplus. It is readily verified that the lower bound
on the lattice of competitive prices is (
¯
p∗A = 2,
¯
p∗B = 6,
¯
p∗C = 11,
¯
p∗D = 0) and
the upper bound is (p¯∗A = 39, p¯
∗
B = 43, p¯
∗
C = 67, p¯
∗
D = 37). Notice that although
agent 3 starts with her most preferred house, trading to the optimal allocation at
competitive prices does not make her worse off and can, depending on which vector
of competitive prices is used, make her better off.
Despite the existence of a range of competitive equilibrium prices, the exposure
problem may preclude efficient trade. Suppose houses are traded one at a time.
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Table 1: House values example
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
House A 60∗ 34 59 36
House B 64 31 57 43∗
House C 65 67∗ 68 43
House D 48 32 57∗ 34
Notes: Example of agents’ values with four agents and four houses. The underlined values
correspond to the initial allocation and the starred values to the optimal one.
To get to the optimal allocation, a series of trades is required. Consider the values
shown in Table 1 and suppose the series starts with agent 2 buying house C from
agent 3 at some price pC . Agent 2’s gain in utility is max(v
B
2 , v
C
2 ) − vB2 − pC and
agent 3’s gain is pC − vC3 . The sum of the agents’ gains is max(vB2 , vC2 )− vB2 − vC3 =
max(31, 67)− 31− 68 = −32. Since this sum is negative, whatever price the house
was traded at, at least one of the agents must have made an exposed trade.
4. Trading mechanisms
This section describes the three trading mechanisms we evaluate: the simple CDA
market, the package market, and decentralized bargaining. (The two strategy proof
mechanisms we consider are described in Appendix A.) In all the mechanisms, trade
is voluntary. In both markets, traders submit orders in continuous time and trade
occurs instantly when a set of compatible orders has accumulated. The markets
differ in the types of order that are admissible. In the simple market, buy and sell
orders are allowed; in the package market, buy, sell, and package orders are allowed.
Under decentralized bargaining, traders propose contracts and a trade occurs when
all the relevant parties accept a contract.
The following framework is used to describe traders’ orders and holdings. An
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order is a pair o = (b,x) where b is a real number representing the amount of
cash being offered or requested and x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N is a vector indicating which
houses are offered or demanded. Positive values indicate an item is demanded and
negative values indicate that it is offered. For example (−20, ⟨0, 1, 0, 0⟩) indicates
“I am willing to pay up to 20 for house B” and (30, ⟨−1, 0, 0, 0⟩) indicates “I am
willing to accept 30 or more for house A.” Orders are submitted in continuous time.
An order is active until it transacts or is withdrawn. Let Ot denote active orders
at time t and let Oti denote the active orders submitted by trader i. Elements of O
t
are denoted oj = (bj,xj). Let ωi ∈ {0, 1}N denote the houses held by trader i and
ci the amount of cash held by trader i.
In the simple market, two types of order are allowed: buying orders (b < 0 and
exactly one component of x is 1 and the rest are zero) and selling orders (b > 0 and
exactly one component of x is −1 and the rest are zero). In the package market,
package orders are allowed in addition to buying and selling orders. A package order
is an order that involves more than one house. The only restriction on package orders
is that something must be given and something must be taken. Swaps involving cash,
such as (30, ⟨−1, 0, 1, 0⟩), are allowed. So are offers to buy, sell or exchange multiple
houses, e.g. (−50, ⟨0, 1, 1, 0⟩), (60, ⟨−1,−1, 0, 0⟩) or (0, ⟨−1, 0, 1, 1⟩).
Each time a new order is submitted, an algorithm is run that determines if any
transactions will occur. The winning orders (and hence the houses that get reallo-
cated) are selected by maximizing the cash surplus. The cash surplus is calculated
using the quantities traders specify in their orders. (Note that since the cash surplus
depends on submitted orders rather than preferences, it need not correspond to the
economic surplus.) Let dj = 1 if order j is winning and dj = 0 otherwise. The
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vector d is found by solving the following:
max
d
∑
j∈Ot
−bjdj
subject to
indivisibility: dj ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ Ot
supply equals demand:
∑
j∈Ot
xkjdj = 0 for all k ∈ H
no short selling:ωki +
∑
j∈Oti
xkjdj ≥ 0 for all k ∈ H, i ∈ I
budget constraints: ci +
∑
j∈Oti
bjdj ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I
Let the set of winning orders be denoted W = {j ∈ Ot | dj = 1} and the set of
losing orders L = Ot \W . For losing orders, the submitter does not pay or receive
anything. For winning orders, the submitter receives or pays an amount of cash
yj ≥ bj. In cases where
∑
j∈W −bj = 0, the total amount of cash offered exactly
matches the amount requested, so yj = bj. In cases where
∑
j∈W −bj > 0, there is a
cash surplus. No revenue is extracted, the entire cash surplus is redistributed. This
means that for some j ∈ W , yj > bj. To determine the division of this cash surplus,
a vector of prices p is chosen that solves the following:7
p · xj + bj ≤ 0 for all j ∈ W
p · xj + bj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ L
Once prices have been chosen, the payment for order j is p · xj .
7Since the solution is not necessarily unique, a way to choose between alternatives is needed.
The approach used is to lexicographically maximize the minimum surplus yj − bj , see Kwasnica
et al. (2005).
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An example of how the algorithm operates in the simple market is shown in the
left panel of Table 2. The columns headings use the variables defined above. Each
row in the table represents an order. Order 1 is offering to sell house A for 20. Order
2 offers to buy house A for 30 and order 3 offers to buy it for 27. The cash surplus
is maximized if orders 1 and 2 are winning. A price for house A of 27 maximizes
the minimum surplus subject to the constraint that supply equals demand.
The right panel of Table 2 shows an example for the package market. Order 1
offers to trade house B for house A without any money changing hands (a “swap”).
Order 2 offers to trade C for house B and pay 6 in cash. Order 3 offers to buy
house A and order 4 offers to sell house C. Finally, order 5 offers to swap house A
for house C. There are two feasible sets of winning orders. First, a “three-cycle.”
consisting of orders 1, 2 and 5 which gives a cash surplus of 6. Second, a “chain” of
length 3 consisting of orders 3, 4, and 5 which gives a cash surplus of 5. The three
cycle gives the higher cash surplus, so orders 1, 2, and 5 are winning and the cash
surplus is divided evenly. Orders 1 and 5 receive 2 cash; order 2 pays 4 cash.8
In the two market institutions, traders submit orders. The orders are matched
by an algorithm, which determines whether any transactions will occur and if so
produces a contract that defines the terms of trade. One can think of a contract
as a set of orders. In the bargaining institution, there is no centralized matching of
orders. Instead, traders propose contracts, and a trade occurs when all the relevant
parties accept a contract. The only restriction on submitted contracts is that the
budget must balance and no one gives anything they do not own.
The stability of allocations can be compared across the three mechanisms using
the concept of m-stability. The package market and bargaining institution al-
8When the winning orders involve more than one house, there is typically a range of house
prices consistent with the cash payments. Hence, in contrast to the simple market, unique prices
cannot be assigned to each house.
15
Table 2: Orders and transactions example
j b x d y
1 20 ⟨−1, 0, 0, 0⟩ 1 27
2 -30 ⟨1, 0, 0, 0⟩ 1 -27
3 -27 ⟨1, 0, 0, 0⟩ 0
j b x d y
1 0 ⟨1,−1, 0, 0⟩ 1 2
2 -6 ⟨0, 1,−1, 0⟩ 1 -4
3 -25 ⟨1, 0, 0, 0⟩ 0
4 20 ⟨0, 0,−1, 0⟩ 0
5 0 ⟨−1, 0, 1, 0⟩ 1 2
Notes: Examples of orders and transactions in the simple market (left) and package market
(right).
low transactions between any two allocations, so non-optimal allocations are never
package-market-stable or bargaining-stable. In contrast, the simple market only
allows transactions where one house changes hands. Accordingly, there are non-
optimal allocations that are simple-market-stable.
5. Experimental design
We conducted two sets of experiments to investigate the exposure problem in the
‘reassignment game’ described in Section 3. The first set compared the performance
of the simple market and package market across a range of environments. A 2×2×2
factorial design was used with the following factors.
Market design: The simple market was compared to the package market. This lets
us test whether the exposure problem causes efficiency losses in the simple market
and, if so, whether the package market performs better.
Level of exposure: A high exposure environment was compared to a low exposure
environment. In the low exposure environment, house values were drawn uniformly
from [0, 50]. In the high exposure setting, the draws were generated by adding
16
25 to the draws from the low exposure treatment. This increases the degree of
exposure without changing the optimal allocation or the gains from trade. To see
why exposure is worse, consider the sum of gains from the first trade where agent
2 buys house C from agent 3 (as in the example of Section 3). When 25 is added,
the net gain is max(vB2 + 25, v
C
2 + 25)− (vB2 + 25)− (vC3 + 25). Adding 25 to all the
values reduces the gain from the first trade by 25. Accordingly, adding the constant
tends to increase the number of exposed trades. Varying the degree of exposure lets
us determine whether differences in market performance were caused by exposure
or other factors.
Information structure: A complete information environment where subjects’ values
for the four houses were public information was compared to an incomplete informa-
tion environment where subjects only knew their own values (and who owned which
house). When values are public information, it is possible for agents to work out
the optimal allocation and identify a sequence of trades to reach it. When values
are private information, this is not possible. Accordingly, it is plausible that the
exposure problem would cause greater efficiency losses under incomplete informa-
tion. Varying the information structure lets us determine whether efficiency losses
are caused by uncertainty about others’ values or other factors such as strategic
uncertainty and hold-out.
In the first set of experiments, the package market performed considerably better
than the simple market. The second set of experiments aimed to answer some
unresolved questions. In total, the second set of experiments included five new
treatments.
Hiding exposed positions: A possible explanation for the poor performance of the
simple market is hold-out. Subjects might be unwilling to take on two houses if
others can see they have two houses as this weakens their bargaining position. To
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test this, an additional treatment with incomplete information and high exposure
was run where who owned which house was hidden.
Bargaining and communication: Another natural question is whether the good per-
formance of the package market could be replicated without the centralized proces-
sing of orders. To test this, four new treatments using decentralized bargaining were
run. Treatments were run with both complete and incomplete information under
high exposure. In these treatments, subjects proposed contracts involving two or
more traders and specifying what each would give and take. If everyone involved
in the contract accepted it, the contract was implemented immediately. Subjects
could make as many proposals as they wished and could trade multiple times. In
natural settings, bargaining usually involves negotiation, and in experiments, cheap
talk often influences outcomes (see e.g. Crawford, 1998). It was not obvious what
effect communication would have in our setting, so to give the bargaining institution
the best chance of success, we ran treatments with and without communication. In
treatments with communication, subjects could send freeform cheap-talk messages
to other members of the group.
The following procedure was used in both sets of experiments. The instructions
were read out loud to the subjects using a short PowerPoint presentation. During
the presentation, subjects could ask questions in public. We chose this format to
ensure common knowledge and to let us explain the user interface of the experimental
software in detail.9 After the instructions, there were three unpaid practice periods.
This allowed subjects to gain experience of using the software and ask additional
questions. The instructions and practice periods together typically lasted 30-40
minutes.
Subjects were assigned to groups of four people that were fixed for the rest of the
9Screenshots of the software subjects used and the slides for the instructions are included in an
online appendix.
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experiment. There were 15 paid periods. In each period, subjects were endowed with
a house and 100 cash. Subjects received new private value draws and endowments
at the start of each period. Within a treatment, the draws varied across groups
but the same draws were used across treatments (for example, trader 2 in group
1 in period 6 would have the same value draws in all treatments) to ensure the
possible gains from trade were identical. In each period, there was three minutes of
trading time.10 In the market treatments, there was no limit on how many orders
a subject could submit. Similarly, in the bargaining treatments, there was no limit
on how many contracts a subject could propose. In the bargaining treatments with
communication, periods lasted six minutes. During the first three minutes, the
subjects could send messages to each other but not trade; during the remaining
three minutes, they could send messages and trade.
A total of 312 subjects took part in the experiment (13 treatments with 24
subjects per treatment). There were two sessions for each treatment. Subjects were
paid based on the realized gains from trade, i.e. for each subject in each period,
earnings were calculated as u(final holdings)− u(endowment). The resulting values
for each of the 15 periods were summed giving a total number of points earned in the
experiment. Subjects were paid 0.2 Swiss Francs for each point plus a show-up fee.
For the treatments without communication, the show-up fee was 15 Francs, average
total earnings were 35 Swiss Francs and the sessions lasted 80 minutes. We used a
higher show-up fee of 30 Francs for the treatments with communication because the
longer periods meant the sessions took longer to complete. With communication,
average total earnings were 55 Swiss Francs and the sessions lasted 120 minutes.
10In a pilot session, longer period times were tried. These produced similar results but subjects
commented that the experiment was too slow.
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6. Results
We compare the simple and package market institutions in terms of efficiency. We
then discuss in detail how exposure affects the continuous double auction. Then we
introduce and estimate a Markov model of trading. Finally, we consider whether
decentralized bargaining with contingent contracts could solve the exposure problem.
6.1. Market performance
First, we focus on the proportion of the potential gains from trade that were realized
in different treatments. Realized gains are calculated at the group level over the 15
periods:
realized gains =
∑15
t=1 Ut − ¯Ut∑15
t=1 U t − ¯Ut
× 100%
where Ut is total surplus (the sum of the utilities of the four group members) in
period t,
¯
Ut is the total surplus if there had been no trade, and U t is the maximum
possible total surplus. The gains realized in the different treatments are shown in
Table 3. Consider the top panel of the table. Changes in the market mechanism or
the degree of exposure have a clear effect on the proportion of gains realized, but
whether or not subjects had complete information has no apparent effect. For this
reason, the complete and incomplete information treatments are pooled in the rest
of the analysis.
Result 1—Market design: In settings with exposure, more of the
gains from trade are realized by the package market than the simple
market.
In the high exposure setting, 20 percent of the gains from trade are realized in the
simple market and 89 percent in the package market. Taking a group as the unit of
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Table 3: Realized gains from trade by treatment
Incomplete Complete
information information Pooled
Exposure Low High Low High Low High
First set of experiments
Simple market 57.4 19.7 53.2 19.7 55.3 19.7
(6.8) (8.8) (6.0) (10.3) (4.4) (6.4)
Package market 81.2 87.1 82.5 90.8 81.8 88.9
(7.9) (3.1) (2.9) (1.9) (4.1) (1.8)
Second set of experiments
Hidden holdings 43.4
(6.0)
Bargaining 60.6 78.8 69.7
(9.3) (4.3) (5.8)
Bargaining + chat 62.2 90.6 76.4
(12.7) (2.4) (7.7)
Simulations
TTC 67.9 in all treatments
MACA 71.6 in all treatments (61.0 excluding auctioneer)
Notes: The percentage of the potential gains from trade that was realized in each of the 13
experimental treatments and the 2 simulations is shown. For the experimental treatments,
bootstrap standard errors are shown in parentheses. These were calculated using 1000
bootstrap replications, taking a group as the unit of observation. The “Pooled” columns
show averages of the “Complete information” and “Incomplete information” columns. The
simulations are described in Appendix A. The simulations make the same predictions in
all treatments because all treatments used the same value draws.
observation, this difference is significant (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney test, n = 24).
In the low exposure setting, 55 percent of the gains from trade are realized in the
simple market and 82 percent in the package market. Taking a group as the unit
of observation, this difference is also significant (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney test,
n = 24). Similar patterns of results occur under complete and incomplete infor-
mation. Three aspects of this result are remarkable. First, the low fraction of the
gains from trade that are realized in the simple market. In other settings, the CDA
often produces efficiency levels close to 100 percent. Second, the size of the effect
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of changing the market institution. In auction experiments, for example, different
auction formats typically realize different proportions of the potential gains from
trade. However, the differences are usually in the range of a few percentage points
(e.g., Brunner et al., 2010). Third, the absence of a treatment effect when informa-
tion about house values is made public. This indicates that observed inefficiencies
are not due to information rents associated with private information but rather with
strategic uncertainty about others’ behavior.
A natural question is whether the package market only performs better in “dif-
ficult” cases where an exchange among three or four subjects is required to achieve
the optimal allocation.
Result 2—Complexity: Market performance is not explained by the
type of exchange cycle required to go from the initial to the optimal
allocation.
We estimate the following linear model for each of the market types in each of the
exposure settings
realized gainsg,t = β1 d[2]g,t + β2 d[3]g,t + β3 d[2, 2]g,t + β4 d[4]g,t + εg,t
The dependent variable is the percentage of potential gains realized. Each variable
d[C]g,t is one for group g in period t if going from the initial to the optimal allocation
involves cycle C (and it is zero otherwise). Here [2] indicates that going from the
initial to the optimal allocation involves only a pair of subjects trading their houses.
Similarly, [2, 2] means that two such pairs are needed while [3] and [4] indicate cases
where three or four subjects are needed to complete the exchange. The analysis is
restricted to cases where the initial allocation is not optimal, hence exactly one of
the d[C] terms is one for each observation. There is no constant term. The estimates
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Table 4: Realized gains by complexity
Simple low Simple high Package low Package high
[2] 3.9 1.6 72.4 87.9
(16.5) (15.0) (9.6) (3.2)
[3] 44.7 12.4 81.1 88.9
(6.7) (9.2) (4.7) (2.3)
[2,2] 47.5 8.1 83.9 81.1
(12.3) (19.8) (10.3) (13.5)
[4] 39.6 1.0 74.2 75.1
(13.8) (23.6) (4.8) (7.2)
#clusters 12 12 12 12
n 172 172 172 172
Notes: There is one observation per group per period. Cases where the initial allocation
was optimal are excluded. The dependent variable is the percentage of potential gains
realized. The independent variables are dummies representing the complexity of the cycle
that is needed to go from the initial to the optimal allocation. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the group level.
are shown in Table 4. For all four market-type and exposure combinations, the null
hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 cannot be rejected (p > 0.05, F -test).
Result 2 shows it is not the complexity of the optimal trade cycle that drives
the difference between the simple and package market. What does? There are two
disadvantages to buying in the simple market. Since houses are substitutes the price
paid for a second house typically exceeds the increase in value to the buyer, a loss
that can be recouped only if the buyer is able to sell the first house. Second, owning
two houses creates a weak bargaining position since the marginal value of the less
preferred house is zero. Others may try to exploit this weaker position by waiting
until the end of the period before making a low offer. Of course, foreseeing both
types of problem, all group members may be hesitant to start trading and be the
first to buy.11 The next result suggests that the simple market is indeed prone to
11Note that these concerns do not apply when package orders are used since subjects can avoid
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Figure 2: Evolution of realized gains from trade
such “hold out” problems.
Result 3—Holdout: In the simple market, most gains from trade
are realized towards the end of the period. In contrast, in the package
market, they are realized at the start of the period.
Figure 2 shows when gains or losses from trade occurred. The three-minute trading
period is divided into nine 20 second blocks. The average number of points gained or
lost during each block is shown for each of the treatments. Clearly, the simple CDA
is subject to a severe holdout problem, which is virtually absent in the package
market where most trading occurs in the first half of the period. Note from the
top-right panel of Figure 2 that the simple market initially has negative gains from
trade when exposure is high. In the next section, we investigate in more detail how
exposure affects the performance of the CDA.
owning two houses at any point in time.
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6.2. The effect of exposure
We now consider the effect of the level of exposure.
Result 4—Level of exposure: Decreasing the level of exposure raises
the gains from trade in the simple market but not the package market.
In the simple market, 20 percent of the gains from trade are realized under high
exposure and 55 percent under low exposure. Taking a group as the unit of ob-
servation, this difference is significant (p = 0.002, Mann-Whitney test, n = 24).
Decreasing the level of exposure does not affect the gains from trade in the package
market. Gains from trade fall from 89% to 82% but this difference is not significant
(p = 0.248, Mann-Whitney test, taking a group as the unit of observation, n = 24).
The difference between the high and low exposure treatments is that in the high
exposure treatments all house values are 25 points higher. This means that the
potential gains from trade are identical in both treatments but that losses from the
first trade are larger in the high-exposure treatment.
The exposure problem can cause efficiency losses in two ways. Traders can fall
prey to exposure by making exposed trades and not recouping losses. Alternatively,
the prospect of falling prey to exposure can make traders reluctant to trade. The
definition exposure (Section 2) can be used to identify cases where the exposure
problem is present. If all the available first trades are exposed, then there is an
exposure problem. The histograms in Figure 3 show the distribution of the gains
and losses from the best first trade in the low and high exposure treatments. The
figure shows how adding a constant to all values shifts the distribution of best first
trades to the left. Notice that the shift does not change the shape of the distribution.
The consequence of the shift is that there are fewer best first trades with a positive
surplus, i.e. the exposure problem occurs more frequently.
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Figure 3: Histograms of the best first trades in the low and high exposure treatments
Notes: The dark bars correspond to negative best first trades, which indicate that at
least one trader must make an exposed trade. When the best first trade gives a loss, the
allocation is simple-market-stable.
Result 5—Exposed trades: When all the available first trades are
exposed, the probability of no trade and the probability of trade leading
to losses both increase.
For the treatments that employed the simple market mechanism, when all available
first trades involve a trader making an exposed trade, the frequency of no trade
increases from 4.1% to 37.3% (5.7% to 40.3%). Similarly, the frequency of trade
leading to losses increases from 6.1% to 28.8% (8.0% to 30.1%). These effects can
be substantiated using Probit models:
Prob(No trade |x) = Φ(α + xβ)
Prob(Loss |x) = Φ(α + xβ)
There is one observation per group per round. If the best available first trade involves
a loss, x = 1 and if not x = 0. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of estimating the
26
Table 5: Probability of no trade
No trade
Low High Pooled
Exposure 0.474∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.076) (0.037)
# Groups 12 12 24
# Obs 180 180 360
Log likelihood −59.62 −101.1 −165.1
Notes: Probit estimations of the probability of no trade in the simple market using ex-
posure as an explanatory variable. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors of the
marginal effects are shown in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the group
level. ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.001.
two models with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the group level. When
exposure is present, there is a significantly higher probability of no trade and of the
group making a loss. The losses typically resulted from failing to make additional
trades after a loss-making first trade.
Figure 4 shows the initial and final unrealized gains from trade disaggregated by
treatment. There is one point on the plot for each group in each period. Using the
notation introduced earlier, the unrealized gains values were calculated as follows:
Initial loss =
¯
Ut − U t
Final loss = Ut − U t
This absolute measure of loss is used instead of a proportional one to make values
from the high and low exposure treatments comparable. The vertical position of
points on the graph indicates how much of the gains from trade were realized. A final
loss of zero means all available gains from trade were realized. In all treatments, the
optimal allocation was achieved by some groups in some periods. In periods where
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Table 6: Probability of losses
Trade leading to loss
Low High Pooled
Exposure 0.248∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.037) (0.040)
# Groups 12 12 24
# Obs 180 180 360
Log likelihood −70.25 −90.24 −161.1
Notes: Probit estimations of the probability of trade leading to losses in the simple market
using exposure as an explanatory variable. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors
of the marginal effects are shown in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the
group level. ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.001.
no trade occurred, points lie on the 45-degree line. This was common in the simple
market and rare in the package market. Points below the 45-degree line indicate
that there was trade but that the final allocation left the group worse off than they
had started. Again, this occurred frequently in the simple market treatments and
rarely in the package market.
The risk of exposure when buying did not go unnoticed by the subjects. The next
result demonstrates that they mostly tried to sell their house rather than buying a
second one and that those who bought were typically worse off.
Result 6—Submitted orders: In the simple market, sell orders are
submitted more frequently than buy orders and those who sell first make
significantly more than those who buy first. In the package market,
package orders are submitted more frequently than simple orders.
Table 7 shows the percentage of buy, sell, and package orders disaggregated by
treatment. In the simple market, it was not possible to submit package orders
whereas in the package market, all types of order were admissible. In the simple
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Figure 4: Realized and unrealized gains from trade in the simple market (left panels)
and package market (right panels)
Notes: Points on the 45-degree line correspond to instances of no trade and points below
(above) the 45-degree line to instances of negative (positive) overall gains from trade.
market with high and low exposure approximately, two-thirds of the orders were
offers to sell. This indicates that subjects were often unwilling to take on two
houses. Indeed, subjects typically made more when they sold first (15.0 points and
13.0 points in the low and high exposure treatments respectively) than when they
bought first (5.6 points and −4.8 points in the low and high exposure treatments
respectively). The difference in gain between those who bought first and those
who sold first is significant in the low and high exposure treatments (p < 0.001
and p < 0.001 respectively, Mann-Whitney tests). In the package market, a large
majority of subjects used package orders.
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of transaction prices versus house values. The right
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Table 7: Submitted orders
Buy Sell Package
orders orders orders
Simple low 35.2% 64.8% −
Simple high 36.5% 63.5% −
Package low 4.0% 11.7% 84.3%
Package high 2.7% 4.3% 93.0%
Notes: “Simple low” refers to the simple market with low exposure, “Package high” to
the package market with high exposure etc. The three columns show the types of orders
placed in the simple and package market under low/high exposure (with data from the
complete and incomplete information treatments pooled).
panels indicate that subjects almost never paid more than their value for the house,
which is to be expected if subjects act rationally. The sell prices shown in the left
panels were frequently below value, which is not necessarily irrational. For example,
when more than one house is held only the value of the best house counts, so selling
one below value can be rational. Indeed, in 73 percent of the cases where the house
was sold below value, the seller had two houses. In contrast, in only 28 percent of
the cases where the house was sold above value did the seller have two houses. The
difference is significant (p < 0.001, Pearson’s chi-squared test). A natural question
is whether the lower profits of traders who bought first was due to other traders
being able to identify them and exploit their weak bargaining position. The first
new treatment in the second set of experiments was designed to disentangle the
effect of this from other sources of inefficiency in the simple market.
Result 7—Hiding exposed positions: Hiding the holdings reduces
but does not eliminate losses due to exposure.
In the simple market with high exposure and hidden holdings 43 percent of the
gains from trade were realized compared to 20 percent when holdings were visible.
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of transaction prices versus house values in the simple market
with low exposure (top panels) and high exposure (bottom panels). The left panels
show sell prices and the right panels show buy prices.
This difference is significant (p = 0.039, Mann-Whitney test, taking a group as
the unit of observation, n = 18). Table 3 shows the efficiency obtained in each of
the treatments. The lower efficiency when holdings are visible is consistent with
the conjecture that being seen holding two houses weakens one’s bargaining posi-
tion. When other traders cannot see you have two houses, you can sell for a higher
price. However, the efficiency level of 43 percent achieved with hidden holdings is
still substantially below the efficiency level of 89 percent achieved with the package
market.
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6.3. Bargaining
Two important features of the package market are the centralized matching of orders
and the use of contracts where several houses change hands which protects traders
against exposure. Could the good performance of the package market have been
achieved by decentralized bargaining? The simple market imposes the constraint
that houses are traded one at a time resulting in an exposure problem. Without
this constraint, under complete information, one might expect bargaining to pro-
duce efficient outcomes. Four treatments in the second set of experiments explored
this conjecture. Subjects traded using decentralized bargaining in the high expo-
sure environment with complete and incomplete information and with and without
freeform cheap-talk messages. The realized gains from the bargaining treatments
are shown in the middle panel of Table 3.
Result 8—Bargaining and communication: Decentralized bargai-
ning with contingent contracts only performs well under complete infor-
mation. The effect of freeform communication is not discernible.
The difference between efficiency under complete and incomplete information is
significant (p = 0.011, Mann-Whitney test, taking a group as the unit of observation,
n = 24). In the bargaining treatments, allowing freeform communication seems to
increase the realized gains but the effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.184,
Mann-Whitney test, taking a group as the unit of observation, n = 24). Although
bargaining produces similar efficiency levels to the package market under complete
information, it cannot replicate the performance of the package market in the more
realistic setting with incomplete information.12 This suggests that unless there is
complete information and perhaps sufficient opportunity for communication, the
12One reason is that agreements involving a single house are almost twice as prevalent in the
incomplete information treatments. See Appendix B for details.
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centralized matching of orders provided by the package market is needed to achieve
efficient allocations.
7. Markov trading model
This section develops a model of how the exposure problem affects market outcomes.
We model the market as an absorbing Markov chain where states are allocations of
houses to traders, moving between transient states represents trading and moving
to an absorbing state represents trade ending. If agents never made exposed trades,
an absorbing state would be entered upon reaching an m-stable allocation. Such
a model, however, would be (trivially) refuted by the experimental results. Accor-
dingly, we incorporate features of models with noisy best responses and strategic
uncertainty.13 This leads to less stark predictions and allows the parameters to be
estimated from the experimental data. In the model, transition probabilities de-
pend on how much traders gain from a trade. Two models of how traders think
about the continuation game are considered. First, where agents only plan k trades
ahead.14 Second, where traders believe futures trades will only occur with probabi-
lity q. A “precision parameter” λ determines how sensitive trades are with respect to
gains. When λ = ∞ trade proceeds deterministically: until an m-stable allocation
is reached if k = 1 or q = 0, but different degrees of foresight can be modeled by con-
sidering k > 1 or q > 0. In contrast, when λ = 0, behavior is random and all trades
are equally likely. For intermediate values of λ, behavior is noisy, not deterministic.
Agents do not always choose the best available trade although they do choose trades
13We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for suggestions that led us to develop this
model.
14The model has some similarities to level-k models. Beliefs are defined iteratively and higher
values of k represent greater sophistication. In our model, k is the number of trades agents look
ahead whereas in level-k models, it is the number of iterated best responses.
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with higher gains more frequently. This allows the model to accommodate observed
cases where agents fell prey to exposure. That is, where losses from an earlier trade
were not fully recovered. The model is tractable and it allows us to make concrete
predictions about the distribution of trades and final allocations.15
The states in the Markov chain are modeled as follows. When there are n
traders each endowed with one house, there are nΩ = n
n ways to allocate the houses
to traders. The allocations are denoted Ω1, . . . ,ΩnΩ and the set of all allocations
is denoted Ωall. The Markov chain has a transient state and an absorbing state
associated with each allocation. The reason for having two states associated with
each allocation is to allow the number of trades to be endogenous and to allow
trade to end at any allocation. The 2nΩ states are ordered such that all transient
states appear before the absorbing states. Allocation Ωr is associated with transient
state Xr and absorbing state Xr+nΩ . We can now define an adjacency matrix A.
Entry ars = 1 if it is possible to transition from state Xr to state Xs and is zero
otherwise. Transition is possible in the following cases. First, when the transition
represents no trade. That is moving to an absorbing state (s = r+nΩ) or remaining
in an absorbing state (r = s and r > nΩ). Second, when the transition represents
a permissible trade. Trades are transitions between transient states, that is when
r ̸= s, r ≤ nΩ, s ≤ nΩ. A trade is permissible if it is possible to get from the
allocation Ωr to allocation Ωs. In the simple market, trades are only permissible
15Modeling trading in the continuous double auction using standard game theory is challenging.
There is a large action space, the move order is undefined, and actions occur in continuous time.
This makes a fully game theoretic analysis almost certainly intractable. Without refinement such
as sub-game perfection, many equilibria are possible in all market mechanisms. E.g. no one sub-
mitting orders is a Nash equilibrium; everyone submitting orders with competitive equilibrium
prices is also a Nash equilibrium; Nash equilibria with less than full efficiency can be constructed
by having some but not all traders submit orders. This would allow many outcomes to be rati-
onalized but does not allow concrete predictions to be made. With sub-game perfection, perfect
information, and an imposed predefined move order, backward induction should allow traders to
execute sequences of trades that once completed leave all better off. This would produce efficient
outcomes with or without package bidding.
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if they involve a single house changing hands. In the package market, trades can
involve any number of houses changing hands. Hence, the matrix A captures the
differences between the simple market and the package market.
We assume that trades are more likely when agents believe they will yield a
higher expected final surplus. Expected final surplus has two components. The
immediate gain from the trade is described by πirs. It denotes agent i’s gain in
utility from their holdings following the transition from Xr to Xs. The anticipated
gains from the continuation game are described by matrix σ. Entry σis represents
agent i’s belief about their gains in the continuation game after a transition to state
Xs. Entries associated with absorbing states (r > nΩ) are zero. For transition Xr
to Xs, the sum of the traders’ gains is
ασrs =
∑
i∈Irs
(πirs + σis)
where Irs is the subset of agents whose holdings change. The probability of making
a transition from Xr to Xs depends on the available transitions at r defined by the
adjacency matrix A, how αrs compares to the value for other available transitions,
and the precision parameter λ.
prs(σ, λ) =
arse
λασrs∑2nΩ
t=1 arte
λασrt
Note that transition probabilities are uniform when λ = 0 and deterministic when
λ→∞. Using the function prs above, for a given σ and λ, a transition matrix Pσλ
can be constructed. Entry prs is the probability of moving from Xr to Xs.
For simplicity, we assume that the price is chosen to split the gains from trade
equally between traders, hence each trader receives α
σ
rs
|Irs| . If beliefs are correct, then
the following relation between the beliefs and transition matrix entries will hold for
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all agents i and for all states r ≤ nΩ.
σir =
2nΩ∑
s=1
prs(σ, λ)
ασrs
|Irs|
We do not impose the assumption that beliefs are correct. Instead, we allow the
agents to only plan k trades ahead. Let σ1 denote the beliefs for k = 1. In this
case, there are no further trades, so for all states σis = 0. Beliefs for k > 1 are then
defined iteratively as follows.
σk+1ir =
2nΩ∑
s=1
prs(σ
k, λ)
ασ
k
rs
|Irs|
We also consider a model were agents believe trade will continue with probability q
after each trade.
σir = q
2nΩ∑
s=1
prs(σ, λ)
ασrs
|Irs|
Using the equations above, for a given pair of parameters λ and k (or λ and q),
a transition matrix can be produced. This matrix gives for each possible allocation,
the probability of different trades occurring and the probability of trade ending. In
addition, given a transition matrix P , there are established procedures for deriving
a matrix of absorption probabilities B such that entry brs is the probability of
eventually being absorbed into state s given the current state r.16
Table 8 shows the parameters, log-likelihood scores, and predictions of different
versions of the Markov trading model. The transition matrix and the observed trades
are used to calculate a log-likelihood score for the model. The transition matrix is
also used to predict the efficiency in the high and low exposure settings with the
simple market and package market (the lower panel of the table). Finally, the root-
mean-square deviation between the predicted efficiencies and observed efficiencies is
16The steps required to derive B from P are described in Grinstead and Snell (1997) chapter 11.
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Table 8: Markov model
Models with fixed parameters Models with estimated parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Simple Package Pooled Simple Package Pooled
λ 0 ∞ ∞ 0.061 0.115 0.089
0.063 0.115 0.089
k 1 1 2 1 1 1
q 0.096 0 0
Loglikelihood −7653 -∞ -∞ −1775 −2067 −4018 −1773 −2067 −4018
Predicted percentage of gains realized
Simple, low −54 70 100 50 63 52 63
Simple, high −121 23 100 36 33 40 33
Package, low −61 100 100 92 87 92 87
Package, high −134 100 100 94 91 94 91
RMSD 160 13 46 12 8 7 14 8 7
calculated (the row ‘RMSD’).
For models 1-3, the parameters were chosen to explore their effect on the mo-
del’s fit and predictions. In model 1, λ = 0 which means transition probabilities are
independent of payoffs and so all trades are equally likely. In contrast, in models
2 and 3, λ = ∞ which means that the selected transition (either a trade or trade
ending) is the one that, given beliefs, gives the highest payoff. In model 2, beliefs are
based on looking one trade ahead which means that trades that lead to allocations
with a lower value than the current allocation are never selected. The model pre-
dicts trade continues until a stable allocation is reached. An allocation is m-stable
(see Definition 4) if there is no single trade that increases the sum of the traders’
surplus. In the package market, all allocations can be reached in one trade so there
is no efficiency loss. In the simple market, there are some stable allocations which
are not efficient since getting to a more efficient allocation requires more than one
trade. The pattern of predicted efficiencies is similar to what was observed in the
experiment, but because the model is deterministic, it cannot account for the noise
in the experimental data. In model 3, where k = 2 beliefs are based on looking two
trades ahead, so temporary surplus losses are tolerated if the loss is recouped in the
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subsequent trade. This model predicts full efficiency in all treatments.
Maximum likelihood estimation of the Markov model’s parameters leads to the
following result.
Result 9—Markov model: For both the simple and package market,
the best fitting Markov model is one where beliefs are based on planning
one trade ahead.
For models 4-6, the parameters λ and k are estimated by maximum likelihood
estimation. Model 4 is estimated using data from the simple market, model 5 using
data from the package market, and model 6 pooling data from both mechanisms.
For all three models, the estimated value of k is one. The predicted efficiencies are
relatively close to the levels observed in the experiment. Similarly, for models 7-9,
the estimated values of q are close to zero. This is consistent with agents planning
one trade ahead.
One explanation for this finding is agents are bounded rational and do not plan
more than one trade ahead. An alternative explanation is strategic uncertainty.
The probabilities of other’s actions in the continuation game are unknown. An
agent who is ambiguity averse or reasons based on the worst case scenario may only
consider the immediate payoffs of a trade, which are certain, and ignore potential
but uncertain gains in the continuation game.
8. Concluding remarks
The experiments reported in the paper were deliberately designed to be simple.
Items were substitutes, there were well-defined property rights and no transaction
costs. In addition, in half the treatments there was perfect information. These
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are conditions where one might expect the Coase theorem to hold and an efficient
outcome to occur no matter how property rights are allocated.17 The results show
that in a standard double auction market only a small fraction of the total gains
from trade are realized, both with complete and incomplete information. This poor
performance is due to the exposure that arises when going from the initial alloca-
tion to the optimal one requires someone to temporally make a loss. The package
market introduced in this paper largely solved the problem. By allowing for orders
that include both a sell and a buy plus some amount of cash, the package market
eliminates the exposure problem and produces efficient outcomes in situations where
the continuous double auction and the top-trading-cycles procedure fail.
The package market shares some features with contingent contracting, which
can also be used to reduce exposure.18 For example, Collins and Isaac (2012) find
that the holdout problem in land assembly can be mitigated using contingent con-
tracts. In some countries, real estate sale contracts can be contingent on the buyer
selling their home, which removes the risk of being left with two houses. There
are important differences with the proposed package market, however. First, in the
context of the real-estate example, contingent contracts typically restrict the seller
from selling to another buyer, in a sense shifting the exposure from the buyer to
the seller, a feature that is not present in the package market. Second, the package
market provides a flexible solution in that orders in the package market do not have
17What has become known as the Coase Theorem was not presented as a theorem by Coase
himself and the concept is somewhat nebulous. Parisi (2008) provides a modern interpretation:
‘The Coase Theorem predicts that, in a competitive market environment without legal or factual
impediments to exchange, the final allocation of rights will be efficient.’ On this reading, one
could argue that in the simple market the restriction that houses are traded one at a time is
an impediment to exchange, and accordingly, the poor performance of the simple market is not
contrary to the theorem.
18Contingent contracts are used in a range of settings and can take various forms. Payments
can be contingent on a natural event occurring, for instance flood insurance, or payments can
be contingent on prices, for instance employment contracts with a wage indexed on the rate of
inflation.
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to identify a counter party, e.g. an offer to exchange house A for house B does
not specify who will take house A. The offer could be part of a transaction cycle
of length three or more, in which case it is not the owner of house B that takes
house A. Importantly, when submitting orders, traders do not have to worry about
which type of transaction cycle will result. In our experiments, decentralized bar-
gaining with contingent contracts delivers efficiency levels comparable to those of
the package market if there is perfect information and communication is allowed.
But in the more realistic case when house values are privately known, the package
market outperforms contingent contracting.
The package format introduced in this paper is a simple extension of the conti-
nuous double auction. As such it has the promise to be applicable in a variety of
circumstances where agents desire to complete all or none of a sequence of trades
but there is uncertainty about whether some of them can be completed. Examples
include markets for expensive durables, corporate bond markets, trading of sports
players, and emission permits (Fine et al., 2017). Another example is the realloca-
tion of airport resources. Landing and take-off slots are complements, so airlines
would benefit from being able to bid for packages of compatible slots. In the long
term, an airline may intend to expand the number of flights per day or number of
destinations served. In the short term, adverse weather conditions such as thun-
derstorms can decrease an airport’s capacity requiring slots to be reallocated (see
Balakrishnan, 2007). A package market, with appropriate safety constraints, could
help ensure slots get allocated efficiently.
A final example concerns the reallocation of licenses to use radio spectrum. Such
licenses have been auctioned off by the US government since 1994. Over time, de-
mand for services that rely on radio spectrum have changed and the technology to
exploit spectrum has improved, e.g. digital television requires much less bandwidth
than analogue transmission. Furthermore, telecom operators that successfully parti-
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cipated in different spectrum auctions now typically own licenses that are dispersed
both in the geographic and frequency domains. Since geographically adjacent, con-
tiguous blocks of spectrum are more valuable there are likely gains from trade. A
package market could facilitate a more efficient allocation of licenses while ensuring
telecom operators that their overall network capacity remains intact.
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PRINT APPENDIX
A. Simulations with strategy proof mechanisms
We considered two strategy proof mechanisms. First, the top-trading-cycles proce-
dure – described by Shapley and Scarf (1974) but attributed to David Gale – that
reallocates houses without cash transfers. Each house owner ranks the houses from
best to worst. House owners point at the house they rank highest among those
available (pointing at one’s own house is allowed). When cycles form, the owners
are assigned the house they are pointing at and the house and owner are removed.
A house and owner is part of a cycle if following the path defined by the pointing
leads back to the owners’ house. The process is repeated with the remaining houses
and owners until all have been removed.
Second, a modified ascending clock auction (MACA). This mechanism was sug-
gested to us by Philippe Jehiel, who also provided his notes, joint with Olivier
Compte, on the mechanism (personal communication, July 23, 2012). In a setting
where initially houses are not allocated, it is possible to allocate them efficiently by
running an ascending clock auction as described by Demange et al. (1986). If hou-
ses are already allocated, running the standard ascending clock auction can make
some participants worse off than if they kept their initial allocation. The modified
ascending clock auction guarantees that participants will end up at least as well off
as with their initial allocation. The cost of this guarantee is that the mechanism
will not always give an efficient allocation.
In this mechanism, each agent is assigned one house, so allocations can be des-
cribed by a mapping µ : I 7→ H. Let the initial assignment of houses to agents be
given by µ0. Let the initial vector of prices be p0 with p0(h) = 0 for all houses. Let
vhi be i’s valuation for h. The pair (µ, p) specifies the house µ(i) that i gets and the
price p(h) paid for h. The participation constraint is i should get no less than v
µ0(i)
i .
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The mechanism works as follows. In round t, the vector of prices is pt and person
i’s demand is Di(pt) = argmaxh(v
h
i − pti(h)) where
pti(h) =
pt(h) if h ̸= µ0(i)0 if h = µ0(i)
If µ0(i) ∈ Di(pt) for some i, then i gets µ0(i) at price zero, house µ0(i) and individual
i are withdrawn and the process continues. Otherwise, if there are some over-
demanded houses, their price is increased. Otherwise, the process stops, i gets
h ∈ Di(pt) and pays pt(h).
For each of the groups and each of the periods, the allocation that would be pro-
duced by running the Top-Trading-Cycles and Modified Ascending Clock Auction
were found. The proportion of realized gains from running the TTC is 68 percent.
For the MACA it is 72 percent although a proportion of this is revenue collected
by the auctioneer. If the auctioneer‘s revenue is not included, the figure is 61 per-
cent. For the simulations, it was assumed everyone plays their dominant strategy.
Despite this, the efficient outcome is not always obtained. This is because obtai-
ning the efficient allocation through voluntary trade sometimes involves one or more
agents receiving monetary compensation for moving to a less preferred house. In
the TTC and MACA mechanisms agents never end up in a less preferred house
so the mechanisms cannot always achieve efficient outcomes. The efficiency figures
are considerably less than the proportion of gains actually realized in the package
market but considerably more than was realized in the simple market.
Result 10—Strategy proof mechanisms: Top-trading-cycles and
the modified ascending clock auction realize more of the gains from trade
than the simple market but less than the package market.
The gains from trade realized in the package market are significantly higher than
those that the two strategy proof procedures could have achieved. A t-test rejects
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the null hypothesis that the realized gains from trade in the package market are equal
to 68%, for both the low (p = 0.009) and high (p < 0.001) exposure treatments.19 In
contrast, the gains realized in the simple market are significantly lower than those
that the two strategy proof procedures could have achieved. A t-test rejects the
null hypothesis that the realized gains from trade in the simple market are equal
to 68%, for both the low (p = 0.02) and high (p < 0.001) exposure treatments.
It is interesting that the simple top-trading-cycles procedure outperforms the CDA
in both the low and high-exposure treatments. It should be noted, however, if the
mechanisms had been run with human subjects, there may have been additional
efficiency losses due to subjects not playing their dominant strategies. For instance,
Chen and So¨nmez (2002, 2006) find that in experiments, a significant proportion of
subjects do not play their dominant strategies in the TTC mechanism.
19When comparing simulation results to experimental results, there is only one random sample
since the simulations are deterministic. Accordingly, we use a one-sample t-test instead of the
two-sample Mann-Whitney.
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B. Further details about the bargaining experiments
In this appendix we analyze the types of agreements that occur in the bargaining
treatments, e.g. whether they involve multiple houses.
Table 9: Bargaining proposals and agreements
Proposals Agreements
% with # houses % with # houses
Treatment 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Incomplete info. 32 55 4 9 23 77 0 0
Incomplete info. + chat 29 66 3 2 12 86 0 2
Complete info. 23 68 4 5 11 86 3 1
Complete info. + chat 15 71 9 4 6 83 7 4
All 28 61 4 7 12 83 3 2
Notes: In the bargaining treatments subjects submitted proposals specifying who would
buy which house and the price. If all traders named in the proposal accepted, the proposal
became an agreement and was executed. Proposals and agreements could involve 1-4
houses. The table reports the percentage of proposals/agreements involving the specified
number of houses.
Table 9 shows the distribution of proposals and agreements involving different
numbers of houses. Consider the columns showing the percentage of proposals and
agreements involving one house in different treatments. Allowing communication
and switching from incomplete to complete information appears to be associated
with less use of one house agreements.
Result 11—Bargaining agreements: Agreements involving only a
single house were twice as prevalent in the treatments with incomplete
information, whether or not freeform communication was allowed. Like-
wise, agreements involving only a single house were twice as prevalent in
the treatments without freeform communication, irrespective of whether
values were private or commonly known.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
C. eZtrade Software
Figure 6: Package market with high exposure and complete information
Notes: The screen is from the point of view of trader 1. The table on the top left of the
screen shows each of the players’ values for the houses and how the houses are currently
allocated. The lower left table is used to construct orders. This is done by entering
figures in the “I give” and “I take” columns. The interface allows arbitrary packages to be
constructed, including swaps with or without cash and offers to buy or sell multiple houses.
As figures are entered, the “Added Value” figure automatically updates to show the player
how their earnings will change if the order transacts. The table on the right-hand side
shows the orders that have been submitted. There are currently two active orders. Trader
1 (labeled “Me”) is offering to give 16 cash and house A in exchange for house D. Trader
3 is offering to swap house C for house B. There have not been any transactions yet.
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Figure 7: Simple market with high exposure, incomplete information and hidden
holdings
Notes: The screen is from the point of view of trader 4. It shows the treatment from the
second set of experiments with incomplete information and hidden holdings. Incomplete
information means that unlike in the previous screenshot, the trader cannot see other
traders’ values for the houses. ‘Hidden holdings’ means the traders cannot see what
houses each of the other traders own or the identity of other traders who have submitted
orders. Because this is a simple market, all the orders involve exchanging a house for cash.
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Figure 8: Bargaining with incomplete information and chat
Notes: The screen is from the point of view of trader 1. The left-hand panel of the screen
is used to construct contracts. A contract involves one or more houses changing hands
and specifies who will give and take each house as well as how much cash each party will
give or take. The panel in the middle of the screen shows the contracts that have been
proposed. Currently, trader 1 is offering to give house A to trader 2 in return for 3 units of
cash. The panel on the right-hand side is used for freeform cheap-talk messages. Messages
can be sent to any combination of the other traders in the group.
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D. Sample instructions
An example of the PowerPoint slides for the instructions is shown on the following
pages. The treatment the slides are from is the package market with incomplete
information and high exposure. The slides describing the environment were the
same for all treatments except that the private value examples were adjusted for
the high and low exposure settings. The slides describing the mechanism and the
user interface of the software were similar across treatments except for differences
necessary to explain the different mechanisms.
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Trading Experiment: Overview
• Instructions
• Practice trading
• 15 paid trading periods (45 minutes)
• Payments: 15 Francs showup fee + for every
point you earn in the experiment you get 0.2
Francs
Trading Periods
• Each period lasts around 3 minutes.
• You will be in a group of 4 people
• You will trade houses.
• You start each period with one house and 100
cash.
• Your earnings depend on which house you own
and how much cash you have at the end of the
period.
• You cannot carry houses or cash between periods
Earnings
Earnings = value of holdings – value of endowment
value = house value + cash 
Me
House A 29
House B 40
House C 65
House D 74
Each house has a private value, which is how much it is worth to you. 
Private values are between 25 and 75 with all values equally likely.    The 
private values are different for each person and change each period.  
If you have more than one house, only the one with the highest 
private value counts.
Example 1
Example 1
endowment (start of period)= house B + 100 Cash = 140
holdings (end of period)= house C + 90 Cash = 155
earnings = 155 – 140 = 15
Me
House A 29
House B 40
House C 65
House D 74
Example 2 & 3
Example 2
endowment = house B + 100 Cash = 140
holdings = house A + 131 Cash = 160
earnings = 160 – 140 = 20
Example 3
endowment = house B + 100 Cash = 140
holdings = house B + house D + 36 Cash = 110
earnings = 110 – 140= ‐30
Me
House A 29
House B 40
House C 65
House D 74
Your trader number The period number
The time 
remaining
My Details Panel Market Panel
The Software Used for Trading
Your earnings Your private value for each 
of the houses
Houses you 
currently own Houses you currently own that do not contribute to your earnings
Used to 
construct 
orders
Trading: Orders and Transactions
• To trade, you must create an “order”
• An order lists what you are offering to trade
• Example:
“give house A, take house D and 20 cash”
Transactions
Player Give Take
#1 20 cash and house A House B
#2 House B 25 cash and house C
#3 5 cash and house C House A
The orders transact
Creating an Order
Enter numbers in the “I give” 
and “I take” columns.
This order 
will increase 
your value 
by +7.3
You can adjust the 
amount of cash 
you are giving or 
taking
Clicking 
submit 
sends the 
order to the 
other 
players
The Market Panel
Who 
submitted 
the order
What the 
player offers to 
give
What the 
player wants 
to take
How much your 
value would 
increase 
Your 
order
Clicking 
“delete” 
cancels your 
order
Clicking “edit” lets 
you change how 
much cash you 
give/take
Editing Orders
Summary: How to make money
• In some periods it might be profitable to trade more
than once.
• In other periods, it might not be profitable to trade.
• If you have more than one house, only the one with
the highest value counts.
• The more cash you take, the more you can earn.
• The more cash you give, the more likely it is that
you will trade.
